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Access: China’s Resource 
Foreign Policy
Shaun Breslin
China’s search for resource security has come under close international scrutiny in recent years. This is partly because of the economic impact on other countries – most notably 
changes in the price and availability of some key resources. But there are also important 
political dimensions to these debates. For example, supporters of a liberal global order are 
concerned that China is undermining attempts to pressure authoritarian states to reform. 
If such states don’t like the conditions that accompany aid and economic relations with the 
West (or more correctly, some in the West), then -if they have things that the Chinese want- 
they can deal with them instead. They might insist that you don’t have political relations with 
Taiwan, and want guarantees that their investments are safe, but they won’t pressure you to 
liberalise your political or economic systems. And as an added bonus, the repayment terms of 
Chinese development loans are often cheaper than those offered by places like the World Bank.
But at the same time, there is recognition in a number of developing countries that helping China meet 
its resource requirements is not always cost-free. Poor employment conditions in some Chinese-owned 
mines, the tendency to use Chinese workers rather than employ locals, the possibility of becoming 
dependent on Chinese demand, and the spectre of China buying up large tracts of land, have all 
generated complaints about Chinese activities in a number of states. 
Moreover, there is a political dimension to debates over resource security in China itself. What looks like 
Chinese power and strength from the outside can look like potential weakness or vulnerability from 
the inside. With China unable to provide for its own requirements, what would happen to the Chinese 
economy if obstacles were put in the way of it accessing the resources China (or perhaps more correctly, 
China’s leaders) want and need? So if you scratch the surface of debates over China’s resource needs, 
you fi nd that they are heavily informed by broader and pre-existing security concerns; either international 
concerns about China’s rise, or concerns within China about possible limitations to that rise.
FROM SELF SUFFICIENCY TO GLOBAL ACTOR 
Interest in China’s global reach in resource sectors is not just a consequence of the extent of this reach, 
but also the speed at which it has occurred. Although heavily dependent on supplies from the Soviet 
Union in the initial years of the PRC, for the best part of thirty years China was largely self-suffi cient. 
Indeed, as China emerged from international isolation in the 1970s, it was through exports of energy 
resources that China slowly rejoined the global economy (in a still rather limited way) and earned 
foreign currency to meet other developmental goals. It was not until 1993 that China became a net 
oil importer, and not really since later in the 1990s that Chinese demand began to exert a signifi cant 
impact on global resource markets.
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Part of this emergence as a global player was a result of 
the way in which China embraced the globalisation of 
production. As it became the workshop of the world, 
running large trade surpluses with major markets in the 
West, China actually ran large defi cits with suppliers 
of resources used to manufacture its exports. So in 
some respects, while we think of ‘China’ as demanding 
and needing resources, this demand is in part at least 
predicated on the demand of consumers in the West 
(and elsewhere) for Chinese exports, and derives in 
part from the decisions of major companies to move 
their productive capacity to China from elsewhere. 
But this demand is also a result of the changing 
structure of the domestic Chinese economy – of the 
expansion of industrial production (for domestic as well 
as international consumption), of massive urbanisation 
(and the immense transformation of existing urban 
centres), and infrastructure development that has 
occurred at times at a bewildering speed. Societal 
changes have not just increased consumer demand, 
but also changed it. Indeed, whole new markets and 
sectors have emerged, such as the private automobile 
market which was all but non-existent before the 
turn of the millennium. It’s also not unfair to point 
to ineffi cient use of resources as being a factor in the 
increase of imports in some sectors.
Arguably the highest profile and perhaps most 
signifi cant changes have been felt in global oil 
markets. This is partly because increased demand 
from China (and other emerging markets) has resulted 
in increasing prices for everybody. Those who are 
sceptical about China’s long-term ambitions also 
point to the way China is investing in and buying up 
long-term supplies in many places, challenging the 
assumptions and interests of existing actors about the 
future. Furthermore, the places that China has turned 
to in its search for supplies has raised some eyebrows 
– countries like Sudan, Iran and Venezuela that have 
not always been seen as forces (or sources) of peace 
and stability in the liberal global order. 
Yet China’s resource demand goes much further 
than just energy. Up until fairly recently, the 
focus has primarily been on industrial resource 
sectors – in addition to energy resources, metals, 
minerals, rubbers, chemical products and so on. 
But as the urban population has grown and consumer 
tastes have changed, China has been unable to 
maintain its goal of being self suffi cient in food 
resources. Soybean imports have increased rapidly, 
and have become a major component of China’s 
economic links with Latin America in particular, as well 
as the United States. Grain imports that are directly 
eaten (rice and wheat) have also increased, but as 
Chinese consumers have begun to demand more 
meat products, imports of grain to feed livestock 
have increased even more rapidly. Imports of sugar 
have also rocketed to meet the Chinese consumers’ 
collective sweeter tooth.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
As already noted, the most striking consequence of 
the growth of Chinese demand has been in the price 
of global resources. Popular attention has tended 
to focus on price rises – and for good reasons (as 
will be discussed shortly). But prices can go down 
as well as up, and for some resources like iron ore 
(for which China is the world’s biggest importer) 
a dip in Chinese demand can have rapid negative 
impacts not just on producers, but also the major 
shipping companies that transport resources to China. 
In other sectors, access to resources (or the lack of 
it) is equally important as pricing; particularly during 
periods when China decides to increase its stockpiles of 
strategic reserves (for example, of copper). Rare earth 
metals used in electronic industries are a particularly 
important and rather unique case. Here, China has a 
near global monopoly on the mining and production 
of neodymium and dysprosium. By restricting exports 
in an attempt to lure high quality (and high value 
added) industries, Chinese government policy has 
had an impact on the global supply of resources used 
in the production of a range of commodities from 
mobile phones and televisions to car batteries and 
glass products. 
While these issues point to problems, the increase in 
Chinese demand has been a positive force for many. 
In a number of African states, trade relationships 
with China have been the catalyst for rapid economic 
growth over the last decade. As well as either 
directly buying locally produced resources, and/or 
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investing in and buying mines, oilfi elds and land, 
China has also become a major source of development 
aid for many African states. This includes loans that 
help develop national infrastructures (some of which 
of course enables the effi cient export of goods and 
resources), and loans from the China Development 
Bank that typically entail partial repayment through 
resources. As China tried to spend its way through the 
global economic crisis in 2009, increased demand for 
resources helped a number of Latin American countries 
offset the downturn in demand from the USA and 
Europe and rebound relatively quickly. 
And it’s not just developing states that have benefi tted 
from Chinese growth. Australian mining sectors have 
boomed on the back of increased Chinese demand, 
while China has now become the biggest export 
market for agricultural produce from the USA. If 
people, companies and countries are competing with 
China, producing the same goods and looking for the 
same resources, then China is often seen as a problem. 
But if you can supply what China wants and needs, 
then it’s a rather different story. 
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL DIMENSION
The West and China’s Resource (in)Security
The emergence of any new actor as large as China 
in global resource markets might be a cause of 
apprehension and concern. But it’s notable that there 
doesn’t seem to be the same level of concern about 
the growth and rise of India as there is about China. 
Indeed, the focus on what China is doing often ignores 
the fact that others are doing it too. It is true that 
Chinese oil imports have increased, but they are still 
dwarfed by imports by the United States; the US 
and the EU remain major investors in Africa; Japan 
has been a more than willing recipient of Sudanese 
oil; and South Korea and a number of Gulf States 
have been actively seeking opportunities to buy land 
in Africa to guarantee long-term food supplies. Yet 
the focus is often on China’s impact on global prices, 
on China’s economic impact on Africa, on China’s 
irresponsible behaviour during the Darfur crisis, and on 
Chinese land grabbing. 
Perhaps this focus on China in part emerges from a 
feeling that Chinese actors aren’t playing fairly and 
that China is not conforming to the interests of major 
Western powers. For example, by talking to and trading 
with people that are shunned by the West, China is 
able to take economic advantage of their political 
isolation. At the same time, by providing an alternative 
to dealing and trading with Western states and/or 
the international fi nancial institutions, China is seen 
to weaken attempts to pressure more authoritarian 
states to liberalise and reform, and to accept liberal 
political and economic norms. This is reinforced by 
China’s declared opposition to intervening in the 
domestic politics of sovereign nation states, and a 
willingness to oppose proposed interventions at the 
United Nations. Thus, for example, China’s resource 
requirements are seen as being one reason behind 
the longevity of the Chavez regime in Venezuela, 
and a key obstacle to pressuring Iran to change its 
nuclear policy. 
There also seems to be considerable fundamental 
distrust of China’s long-term objectives, based on 
an apparent assumption that if China gains control 
of resources then they will be transferred back to 
China for China’s sole use, rather than being sold 
on into global markets for anybody to buy. The idea, 
then, is that there is a grand strategy orchestrated 
by the Chinese state and enacted by giant State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to corner markets and 
create monopolies that will be to the detriment of 
other global actors, and possibly even to the global 
economy as a whole. So while selling things to China 
(and buying cheap goods from China) might make 
sense, allowing China to buy and control long-term 
supplies of resources is an entirely different matter.
China’s leaders sometimes feed this suspicion by using 
major international events to articulate their goals 
and objectives in ways that make it look very much 
as if China has a grand strategy. When it comes to 
dealing with other developing states, there is also a 
clear attempt to show China as being very different 
from other previous great powers – powers that 
were perceived as arrogant and bullying, and who 
established unequal economic relationships to benefi t 
themselves at the expense of the colonised developing 
state. While the primary target of these messages
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is the developing states themselves – to reinforce the 
idea that China will treat them with respect while 
seeking mutual ‘win-win’ benefi ts – its perhaps not 
surprising that the message is not always welcomed 
in the developed economies that are being criticised. 
The size and power of China’s SOEs also reinforces 
this concern. In the wake of the global fi nancial crisis, 
it seems as if China is one of the few countries that 
has the fi nancial resources available to turn goals 
and aspirations into realities through state-sponsored 
investment and loan activities overseas.
While the search for long-term supplies is real and 
forms part of an overarching strategy, we need to take 
care not to see everything as part of an orchestrated 
state plan. The Chinese state has a strategy and 
objectives, but so too do Chinese companies. Often 
their objective is simply to make money – and this 
includes making money by selling what they produce 
and/or own to others rather than just shipping it 
back to China. It is also increasingly common to 
fi nd Chinese SOEs competing with each other for 
projects, rather than working together to attain 
common and shared state goals. Rather than Chinese 
aid and loan programmes representing a coherent 
state strategy, they are often initiated by Chinese 
companies who want to use development fi nance 
as a means of expanding their operations (and their 
profi ts) within developing countries. And although 
SOEs remain dominant in large scale projects, smaller 
local government-owned and private companies are 
playing an important and increasingly independent 
role in China’s overseas activities. 
The ‘South’ and China’s Resource (in)Security
China’s search for resources has unsurprisingly been 
met with somewhat less scepticism in most developing 
states. China is not only an important new market 
for them, but is also a country that attaches very 
few political conditions to economic relations. Not 
recognising Taiwan as an independent political entity 
is a bottom line (and countries that are prepared 
to switch economic recognition from Taiwan to 
the PRC are well rewarded), and not welcoming 
the Dalai Lama is appreciated. Whilst not a formal 
condition, supporting China’s position when it comes 
to votes on its human rights record is also valued. 
But China is not going to insist on good governance 
political reforms, or extensive economic liberalisation 
and privatisation, before extending development loans 
or signing commercial contracts. For leaders in some 
developing states, China’s example of how to promote 
rapid economic development without simultaneously 
democratising and diluting the power of state elites 
has also become a rather attractive ‘model’. 
This said, China’s resource engagement of other 
developing states is not an unquestioned good news 
story. That Chinese equipment and workers are often 
used in Chinese projects has led to complaints about 
the shallow nature of Chinese engagement – countries 
and companies make money from China, but the 
broader population does not gain much. Conversely, 
in some cases where large numbers of locals have 
been employed – for example, in copper mines in 
Zambia – there have been complaints about low 
pay, poor (and illegal) work conditions and a lack of 
interest from Chinese managers when complaints 
are made. There has also been hostility towards the 
Zambian government for not insisting that the law 
is adhered to. Even when Chinese managers shot 
striking workers prosecutions conspicuously failed to 
follow, with the fact that copper mining is the major 
source of exports and government income in Zambia 
thought to be no mere coincidence.
Zambia is perhaps the most extreme case – or at 
least the place where complaints and concerns 
about Chinese economic activities and infl uence over 
domestic politics have been clearest and loudest – but 
similar issues have also been raised in other African 
states. In Latin America, the focus seems to be more 
on the danger of switching previous dependence on 
the United States and the West for a new dependence 
on China. This is particularly the case where one or 
two commodities dominate resource exports to China 
and there is very little diversity in the export basket.
This concern also seems to be inspired by changes in 
how China wants to source its resource requirements 
from the region. Rather than just buying soybeans, for 
example, Chinese companies have been increasingly 
seeking to buy land to produce the soybeans on 
themselves. As already noted, China is far from 
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the only country actively seeking land overseas to 
provide for its food security in the long-term. But 
whomever the potential buyer, selling land seems to 
generate different sentiments and concerns compared 
to selling resources – and not just in Latin America.
CHINA’S RESOURCE (IN)SECURITY
One of the reasons that China has been looking to 
Latin America for soybean supplies is an attempt to 
diversify its imports away from the United States, in the 
context of Chinese fears about potential dependence 
on an unreliable if not downright hostile economic 
partner. Indeed, if we go back to the mid-1990s 
when China was fi rst beginning to emerge as a global 
resource actor, concerns about the nature of the global 
balance of power was already playing a role in shaping 
Chinese policy. At that time, there were a number of 
events that seemed to indicate a concerted attempt 
to demonise China and prevent it from retaining its 
‘rightful’ place in the world. This included linking 
China’s attempts to join the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) to human rights issues, and the only very 
narrow failure of a vote to condemn China at the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 
1995. It also included the failure of Beijing to win the 
Olympic Games in the 1993 vote, an outcome that was 
widely interpreted in China at the time as a clear and 
deliberate case of political interference by the West.
So China re-emerged on the global economic stage 
with many Chinese convinced that some in the West 
were deliberately creating a ‘China Threat thesis’ to 
create unease over Chinese objectives and goals. 
As the need for imported resources increased (as 
well as the need to maintain access to markets to 
facilitate export led growth), then a new interest in 
economic and resource security began to emerge, with 
a heavy emphasis on perceived insecurity and potential 
vulnerability. This insecurity was only exacerbated 
when the 1997 Asian fi nancial crisis briefl y threatened 
to derail China’s growth momentum. China’s resulting 
resource diplomacy has subsequently refl ected a 
perceived need to reassure others that China will 
not disrupt the global order, but is instead a force 
for peace, stability and common wealth. As imported 
resources – fi rst energy, then other raw materials 
and more recently, food – became increasingly 
important in attaining domestic development goals, 
then maintaining a stable international environment 
in which China could get what it needed became 
ever more important. 
Because part of this message entails establishing 
that China won’t repeat the mistakes and crimes of 
previous great powers as they expanded their global 
reach, claims to responsibility that have not always 
been believed, particularly in the West. And yet the 
record shows that while China might not always be 
very quick in responding to international pressure to 
weaken its links with supposed ‘rogue states’, China’s 
leaders have responded to negative judgements and 
shifted their policies. And it clearly irks people in China 
(and not just the Chinese leadership) that Chinese 
resource companies continue to be prevented from 
successfully bidding for commercial deals because 
they supposedly represent security challenges to the 
United States and others. 
There is also something of a tension between the 
desire to show Chinese responsibility on one hand, 
and the importance of reinforcing China’s rightful core 
interests on the other. These core interests include 
defending China’s sovereign territorial integrity, but 
a key problem here is that the maritime limits of this 
sovereign territory are not accepted by many of China’s 
regional neighbours, who have confl icting claims. 
Who owns (or perhaps more correctly, controls) these 
waters has important implications for resource politics 
– not just in terms of potential underwater energy 
supplies but also in terms of controlling key sea-lanes 
of communication. The rather strident assertion of 
Chinese territorial claims in recent years thus reveals 
the Janus-faced way in which the state is promoting 
China’s national identity in search of long-term security. 
On the one hand, there is the image of a responsible 
and peaceful China, and on the other, a China that is 
committed to doing whatever it takes to secure what it 
believes to be its rightful possessions. These tensions in 
Chinese policies are partly a refl ection of the increased 
complexity of Chinese politics, with different actors 
promoting different identities and preferred policies. 
But the result is that it allows external observers to 
emphasise the image and idea of China that gives 
credence to their pre-existing opinions. 
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CONCLUSION
Concern about resource insecurity has resulted in the establishment of new priorities and objectives for 
China’s international economic interactions, focusing on the search for secure and reliable sources for the 
long-term. But the existence of an overarching goal does not mean that the state is in control of everything 
that happens in the supposed name of China. With even large SOEs typically operating with considerable 
operational autonomy overseas, it becomes very diffi cult for the state to establish and maintain a preferred 
identity as a specifi c type of international actor. As more and more Chinese actors get involved in resource 
industries on the ground in different countries, this task is likely to get even harder. 
Moreover, as China increases its global reach, not least because of the need to secure sustainable supplies 
of resources for the future, it is increasingly being drawn into debates and confl icts that its leaders would 
presumably prefer to avoid. China’s economic contacts with Sudan, Libya and Iran are three good examples. 
In the process, maintaining a strict and uncompromising non-interventionist policy appears to be becoming 
progressively more diffi cult to maintain. 
In combination, these two issues suggest that China is increasingly facing the sort of confl icting pressures, 
logics and demands that are part and parcel of being a major global economic actor. Perhaps we could even 
suggest that China is looking more and more like a ‘normal’ economic power. But this normality is qualifi ed in 
two ways. First, there is a considerable section of the international community that remains unconvinced – and 
perhaps can simply never be convinced – about this normality, and continue to see China as an revisionist and 
predatory state. Second, there is a strand of Chinese rhetoric and policy pertaining to issues of sovereignty 
that does much to worry people (primarily, but not only, in China’s own backyard) about China’s long-term 
pacifi c intentions. 
Increasing domestic industrial effi ciency and the further expansion of new sources of energy might alleviate 
some of the need to look overseas for ever more resources. But it is not going to make the issue go away, 
and in addition to the search for industrial supplies, it seems likely that the search for food security is going 
to become ever more urgent in coming years. As this could place still greater focus on the ownership of 
land, then China’s international resource politics might become an even more sensitive issue in a number of 
countries in the future. Maintaining and promoting the idea of Chinese responsibility could thus become an 
increasingly important task – but at the same time, an increasingly problematic one. ■ 
